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In this paper, we define a new class of richness measures. In contrast to the often used 
headcount, these new measures are sensitive to changes in rich persons’ income and 
therefore allow for a more sophisticated analysis of richness. We demonstrate the application 
of these new measures to analyze the development of poverty and richness over time in 
Germany, to compare Germany to many other European countries and to investigate the 
impact of tax reforms on poverty and richness. Using these examples, we show the 
importance of taking into account the intensity of changes and not only the number of people 
beyond a given richness line (headcount). We propose to use the new measures in addition 
to the headcount index for a more comprehensive analysis of richness. 
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The ﬁnancing problems of European welfare states and the increasing pressure of global eco-
nomic competition have given rise to a debate whether the gap between rich and poor is widen-
ing in general and as a consequence of recently implemented reforms of the tax and transfer
system in particular. Poverty at the bottom of the income distribution has been in the spotlight
of both academic research and political discussion since a long period of time. Quantitative
studies of income poverty are for example Krause and Wagner (1997) or Hanesch et al. (2000)
for Germany, and Atkinson (1997) and de Vos and Zaidi (1997) comparing European countries.1
While it is indisputable that society should ensure a certain minimum subsistence level, the top
of the income distribution has just recently become a particular focus of attention, especially
in the context of income tax reform. Studies on income richness2 are for example Krause and
Wagner (1997) or Merz (2004). Since 2000, the German parliament has been demanding regular
governmental reports on poverty and richness (see Bundesregierung, 2001, 2005, 2008). Many
recent tax reforms proposals with a tendency to lower (marginal) tax rates have been criticized
for redistributing from the poor to the rich (see e.g. OECD (2006)). It is widely believed that
the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer.
Given this debate, appropriate summary measures, which provide additional information be-
yond analyzing the inequality of the whole income distribution, are of key importance for an
empirical assessment of the development of poverty and richness. Several poverty indices have
been developed in the long tradition of the literature on measuring income poverty. Measuring
income richness is a less considered ﬁeld. As far as we know, empirical studies mainly use the
population share of rich persons (headcount ratio) to measure income richness.3 However, the
headcount is not a satisfying measure for either poverty or richness. It is only concerned with
the number of people below (above) a cutoﬀ. Therefore, if nobody changes his or her status,
an income change will not aﬀect this index.
1A microsimulation study of the eﬀects of a minimum pension policy to reduce poverty in several European
countries can be found in Atkinson et al. (2002).
2We use richness as a synonym for aﬄuence in this paper.
3There is a series of recent papers using income shares to analyze the top income distribution (see, e.g.,
Atkinson (2005), Dell (2005), Piketty (2005), Saez (2005), Saez and Veall (2005), Piketty and Saez (2006),
Atkinson and Piketty (2007), Aaberge and Atkinson (2008), Roine and Waldenstr¨ om (2008)).
1Looking for a more sophisticated measure of richness, this paper contributes by deﬁning a new
class of richness indices analogous to well-known measures of poverty. Our approach is more
sophisticated because it takes the intensity of changes and not only the number of people beyond
a given richness line into account. To demonstrate the usefulness of these new measures, we
analyze three empirical problems: ﬁrstly, we look at the development of poverty and richness
indices over time in Germany (ex post longitudinal analysis). Secondly, we compare the values of
these indices for Germany with diﬀerent European countries (cross-country analysis). Thirdly,
we compute the values of these indices for diﬀerent reform proposals of the German tax and
transfer system (ex ante analysis). Our analysis is based on household micro data provided by
GSOEP, EU-SILC and the microsimulation model FiFoSiM.
The empirical application reveals that our new measures expand the results beyond a pure head-
count analysis. We ﬁnd distinctive diﬀerences in our longitudinal analysis of the development
of richness in Germany. It depends on the measure whether richness is increasing (headcount)
or decreasing (some of the new measures) regarding various time periods. The new measures
also clarify diﬀering eﬀects of the German reuniﬁcation. When comparing aﬄuence in countries
across Europe, our new measures reveal additional information beyond the proportion of rich
people. The composition of “the rich”is also accounted for by the newly deﬁned measures. The
cross-country analysis yields diﬀerent groups of countries according to their values of poverty
and richness indices. In general, Eastern and Southern European countries as well as Anglo-
Saxon countries are characterized by rather high poverty and richness, whereas Continental
and Northern European countries can be distinguished by rather small values of poverty and
richness. Finally, our analysis of ﬂat tax reform proposals for Germany shows the diﬀerence
between concave and convex measurement empirically. These empirical examples demonstrate
the usefulness of our new measures. We suggest to use them in addition to the headcount index
for a more comprehensive analysis of richness.
The setup of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes well-known poverty indices.
In section 3 we deﬁne analogue indices of richness and report the main diﬀerences. In section 4
we describe the micro data used for the analysis. Section 5 reports the results of our empirical
analysis for Germany and the European cross-country analysis. Section 6 concludes.
22 Poverty indices
Many poverty indices have been proposed in the literature.4 We focus on a class of indices that
contains the two most common measures, the headcount and the Foster et al. (1984) indices
(FGT).
Consider a net income distribution x = (x1,x2,...,xn) ∈ Rn
+, where n is the number of
individuals or households. Let π be the poverty line, e.g. 60% of the median income, and
p = #{i|xi < π, i = 1,2,...,n} the number of poor persons.











where u : R+ → R+ is decreasing on [0,1) and vanishes on [1,∞). Examples are:











with 1xi<π = 1, for xi < π and 1xi<π = 0 elsewhere.





























with α > 0 and (y)+ := max{y,0}. The coeﬃcient α may be interpreted as a parameter
of poverty aversion, since greater values of α attach increasingly greater weight to large
poverty gaps.
• Other examples of this form (1) are the indices by Watts (1968) and Chakravarty (1983).
4See Zheng (1997) or Chakravarty and Muliere (2004) for recent surveys of the vast literature.
33 New measures of richness
Before we deﬁne new measures of aﬄuence or richness, we give a short review of the sparse
literature and on desirable properties.
3.1 Review of the literature
While all poverty indices of the previous section are well-known, little research has been done
on the measurement of richness at the top of the income distribution. For an overview of the
sparse literature see Medeiros (2006). The ﬁrst challenge is to deﬁne an aﬄuence or richness
line. We deﬁne it analogously to the poverty line as a cutoﬀ income point above (below) which
a person or household is considered to be rich (non-rich). Like the poverty line, it is possible
to deﬁne the richness line in absolute terms (e.g. 1 million Euros) or relative terms (e.g. 200%
of the median or the mean income).
Let ρ be the richness line and r = #{i|xi > ρ, i = 1,2,...,n} the number of rich persons. In












with 1xi>ρ = 1, for xi > ρ and 1xi>ρ = 0 elsewhere. Its deﬁnition resembles that of the poverty
headcount ratio. But if we want to compare diﬀerent tax and transfer reform scenarios, this is
not a satisfying deﬁnition of richness: if nobody changes his or her status (rich or non-rich),
neither a change in a rich person’s income nor a transfer between rich persons will change this












max{xi − ρ,0}. (5)
The advantage of this deﬁnition compared to the headcount is that this aﬄuence gap is in-
creasing in income. However, Medeiros’ index of richness is not standardized and is an absolute
measure of richness. RMed is proportional in income implicitly, i.e. a transfer between two
rich persons will not change the index. Further on, this absolute index is not scale invariant,
4i.e. multiplying all incomes with a scalar increases RMed by this factor. To overcome these
drawbacks, we propose a standardized approach of richness measures bounded by the unit in-
terval. Such a standardization is important because we want to make the indices of richness
commensurable to indices of poverty, and it will be discussed in further detail below.
3.2 Desirable properties of richness indices
The general idea for measuring richness analogously to poverty is to take into account the
number of rich people as well as the intensity of richness. Thereby, an index of aﬄuence is
constructed as the weighted sum of the individual contributions to aﬄuence. The weighting
function of the index shall have some desirable properties which are derived following the
literature on axioms for poverty indices.
Multiple axioms have been suggested in literature on poverty measurement (see e.g. Sen (1976),
Chakravarty and Muliere (2004), Foster et al. (1984)). We translate these axioms to the
measurement of richness as desirable properties that an index of aﬄuence should satisfy5:
• Focus axiom: a richness index shall be independent of the incomes of the non-rich.
• Continuity axiom: the index shall be a continuous function of incomes, i.e. small changes
in the income structure shall not lead to discontinuously large changes in the richness
index.
• Monotonicity axiom: a richness index shall increase if c.p. the income of a rich person
increases.
• Subgroup decomposability axiom: the overall degree of richness may be decomposed into
the (population) weighted sum of subgroup richness indices.
The transfer axiom of poverty measurement cannot be translated one-to-one to richness mea-
surement and has to be discussed in more detail. A poverty index satisﬁes the transfer axiom if
5We do not give a formal notation of these axioms but rather state them informally, although they can be
easily noted mathematically precise.
5the index decreases when a rank-preserving progressive transfer from a poor person to someone
who is poorer takes place. This property can be translated to richness measurement in two
diﬀerent ways:
• Transfer axiom T1 (concave6): a richness index shall increase when a rank-preserving
progressive transfer between two rich persons takes place.
• Transfer axiom T2 (convex): a richness index shall decrease when a rank-preserving
progressive transfer between two rich persons takes place.
The question behind the deﬁnition of these two opposite axioms is: shall an index of richness
increase if (i) a billionaire gives an amount x to a millionaire, or (ii) if the millionaire gives the
same amount x to the billionaire. This question cannot be answered without moral judgement.
In the following subsection, we deﬁne a general class of richness measures which allows to
apply both transfer axioms. However, we argue that the concave transfer axiom (T1) is more
appropriate in the context of the analysis of tax beneﬁt systems.
3.3 Deﬁning a new class of richness measures
3.3.1 General class
In general, a richness index satisfying the four axioms and either T1 or T2 can be deﬁned












where f is a continuous (except for the headcount), strictly increasing function that is either
concave (for T1) or convex (for T2). We use strictly increasing transformations because the
indices of aﬄuence should be sensitive to higher incomes, i.e. satisfy the monotonicity axiom.
To fulﬁll the focus axiom, a person with an income not higher than ρ should not inﬂuence the
6Unless otherwise stated, concave and convex are meant in the strict sense.
6measure of richness, i.e. f(
xi
ρ ) = 0, for xi ≤ ρ. To fulﬁll the subgroup decomposability axiom,
the index of richness has to be additively decomposable, i.e. the aﬄuence index is a weighted







for any given richness line ρ, M population subgroups indexed m = 1,...,M, nm the number of
people and Rm(x,ρ) the richness index of subgroup m with the same overall richness line ρ.
3.3.2 Concave class (T1)7
As mentioned above, an important diﬀerence between the measurement of poverty and richness
concerns the transfer axiom. In poverty measurement decreasing the income of a very poor
person shall have a larger eﬀect than increasing the income of a less poor person (minimal
transfer axiom). We propose that an aﬄuence index shall be less sensitive to changes of very
high incomes, i.e. a progressive transfer between rich persons increases aﬄuence (concave
transfer axiom (T1)). Formally spoken f has to be concave. The relative incomes
xi
ρ then have
to be transformed by a function that is concave on (1,∞).
The technical reason for the concavity in our approach is the possibility to standardize the
index. Many poverty indices are standardized such that the individual extent of poverty has
the value one if a person has no income at all, and zero if a person has income at or above the
poverty line. If we translate this into measurement of aﬄuence, a person with income at or
below the aﬄuence line would contribute zero to the aﬄuence index and contribute nearly one
if he is “very, very rich”. However, there is an obvious diﬀerence between the income classes of
the poor and of the rich: the incomes of the poor are bounded by 0 and π, but the incomes of
the rich only have a lower bound ρ. The problem here is that it is not obvious how to transform
the incomes of the rich to the unit interval.8 We transform the incomes of the rich relative to
the aﬄuence line,
xi
ρ , to the unit interval by a strictly increasing transformation function f,
7We call the richness index concave or convex if the individual aﬄuence function f is concave or convex.
8If the individual contribution to the aﬄuence index, e.g. for the aﬄuence gap xi−ρ, is divided by xmax−ρ
(or xmax), i.e. the aﬄuence of the richest person with income xmax, the index will not fulﬁll the monotonicity
axiom, since increasing the income of the richest person will decrease the index.
7with limy→∞ f(y) = 1. Alternative functions that are non-concave, i.e. either linear or convex,
do not allow for a standardization and, therefore, individual aﬄuence will be unbounded in
these cases.
Of course, choosing a concave function is a normative judgment. Therefore, beside the technical
argument, we give four arguments to support our point of view and argue why we prefer a
concave function:
Firstly, to decide in which society there is more aﬄuence, we use the “equiprobability model
for moral value judgments” of Harsanyi (1977). A risk averse decision maker with diminishing
marginal utility in income (the standard assumption in economic theory) has to decide between
two populations. The second population is obtained from the ﬁrst by some progressive transfers
between rich persons, i.e. money is transferred from the richer to the less rich rich person. The
decision maker does not know what his position will be in the societies. He will prefer the second
population since the expected utility will be higher there. Therefore, a concave utility (or value)
function with diminishing marginal utility in income supports a concave value function for the
richness index.
Secondly, a more equal distribution of the rich will lead to a more homogenous group with
probably more equal interests and, therefore, more inﬂuence on decisions of the society. Thus,
the concerns of the rich are more visible and important in that population. This view can be
somehow seen as the “polarization view”, i.e. richness is increasing when the homogeneity of
the top of the distribution and, therefore, c.p. the polarization increases.9
The third point is that people are rather envious of a rich dentist living next door gaining several
hundred thousand euros, but admire superstars, far away via TV, gaining several millions or
admire a self made billionaire like Bill Gates.10 This assertion supports the concave view, i.e.
that Bill Gates’ individual aﬄuence and its contribution to a measure of richness does not
increase very much if he receives another million (diminishing marginal utility). Whereas the
individual aﬄuence of the dentist increases tremendously if he received that million.
The fourth argument is that we have to look how societies treat their rich people, especially how
9The contrast to this point of view is the “inequality view” which would be satisﬁed if richness increased
when inequality (among the rich) increased. This view is satisﬁed with the convex transfer axiom (T2).
10Cf. Lockwood and Kunda (1997) and the psychological literature cited there.
8they tax them. Usually, a progressive tax system is applied where the (marginal) tax payments
are a concave function of taxable income. However, the marginal tax rate increases only up to
a certain income level and remains constant above. In this way we get the accepted point of
view implicitly. In Germany for example, there is a maximum tax rate of 42% (in 2006) and
progression ends close to the richness line.












where f : R+ → [0,1] is strictly increasing and concave on (1,∞).11





· 1y>1, with α ∈ (0,1), we obtain an aﬄuence index RFGT,T1
α , that





























, α ∈ (0,1). (9)
The new aﬄuence index increases with a progressive transfer between a rich and a very rich
person (T1), since (
x−ρ
x )α is concave on (ρ,∞), for 0 < α < 1.





· 1y>1, β > 0 and obtain an index analogous to the















, β > 0. (10)
Obviously, f(y) = (1 − (
ρ
y)β) is concave for y > ρ and β > 0 (T1). One can easily see that
R
FGT,T1
1 (x,ρ) = RCha




β→∞ respectively resemble the headcount index RHC.
The advantage of RCha
β over RFGT,T1
α is the possibility to construct indices with ”slowly” in-
creasing functions f (see Figure 1) whereas RFGT,T1
α is not concave for α > 1. Therefore, we
11A case, without standardization is the Watts (1968) measure of aﬄuence, i.e. π = ρ, f(y) = ln(y) for
y > 1.
9will use RCha















Figure 1: Graphs of f(y) for RFGT,T1
α (left hand side) and RCha
β (right hand side), for diﬀerent α and β.
Nevertheless, there is a drawback to our concave approach. We are not able to postulate a
strong transfer axiom, i.e. how a progressive transfer between a rich and a non-rich (who
becomes rich) will change the aﬄuence index. The following example shows this problem:
xi xi,new xj xj,new
ρ
xi xi,new xj xj,new
ρ
Figure 2: Transfers between a rich and a non-rich.
If we split a progressive transfer between a rich person and a non-rich person that becomes
rich in two transfers (see Figure 2, right hand side), the ﬁrst transfer decreases the aﬄuence of
person j because of the monotonicity axiom, whereas we do not care for person i because of
the focus axiom. The second transfer increases aﬄuence. Altogether, for a progressive transfer
with a change from non-rich to rich, it is not clear whether aﬄuence increases or decreases.
This is diﬀerent to poverty measurement, where we can split such a transfer in two transfers
and poverty decreases in both steps.
3.3.3 Convex class (T2)
Although we think a concave weighting function f is more appropriate due to reasons given
above, it is still possible to deﬁne measures of aﬄuence R(x,ρ) (equation 4) satisfying the











, α > 1, (11)
where f is strictly increasing and convex on (1,∞).
If we use f(y) := (y − 1)
α for y > 1, with α > 112, we obtain an aﬄuence index RFGT,T2
α , that

























This aﬄuence index decreases by a progressive transfer between a rich and a very rich person
(T2), since (
x−ρ
ρ )α is convex on (ρ,∞) for α > 1. We will use this index in the remainder of
this paper as our convex measure of aﬄuence, which we compare with the concave RCha
β .
3.4 Examples
We now illustrate some properties of our new measures by small examples:
Example 1: A change in a rich person’s income shall change the measure of richness (mono-
tonicity axiom): Consider two populations with income distribution
x = (5,5,5,11,11) and y = (5,5,5,100,100).
Let ρx, ρy be 200% of the median income. Then ρx = ρy = 10 and we obtain
R
HC(x,ρ = 10) = R
HC(y,ρ = 10) = 0.400,












α=2 (x) = 0.004 and R
FGT,T2
α=2 (y,) = 32.4.
The results for the measures RCha
β=1, RMed and R
FGT,T2
α=1 all indicate that (the intensity of) richness
is lower in the population x, i.e. R(x) < R(y).13
Example 2: Transfer axiom T1 (T2): A richness index shall be less (more) sensitive to changes
of very high incomes: Let
x = (5,5,5,11,9989) and y = (5,5,5,1000,9000),
where y is obtained from x by a progressive transfer of 989 monetary units between the two




but quite diﬀerent results for the intensity measures:
R
Cha








α=2 (x) = 19,916,088 and R
FGT,T2
α=2 (y) = 16,360,039.
According to RCha
β=1, richness is lower in population x which is in line with the concave transfer
axiom T1, i.e. a richness index shall increase with a progressive transfer. The values of the
absolute RMed index is the same in both populations, indicating that redistribution takes place
only among the rich subpopulation. As expected, R
FGT,T2
α=2 (x) > R
FGT,T2
α=2 (y), i.e. this richness
13Note that multiplying all incomes by a scalar, e.g. 2, leaves all relative richness measures unchanged (scale
invariance), whereas the value of the absolute richness measure RMed doubles.
12index decreases with a progressive transfer between two rich persons. A drawback of this
approach, however, is that these indices are not standardized.
4 Data and methodology
Our analyses are based on three diﬀerent data sources. For the analysis of the development
of the indices in Germany, we use panel data from the GSOEP. Data from the EU-SILC is
used for the cross-country comparison, whereas data provided by the microsimulation model
FiFoSiM is used for the analysis of tax reforms. All three sources are described in the following
subsections.
4.1 GSOEP
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a representative panel study of private house-
holds in Germany since 1984. It includes in each wave the incomes of the previous year. In
2007, GSOEP consists of about 12,000 households with more than 30,000 individuals. The data
include information on earnings, employment, occupational and family biographies, health, per-
sonal satisfaction, household composition and living situation.14
4.2 EU-SILC
EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) is the successor of
ECHP data. The EU-SILC collects comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimen-
sional micro data on income and social exclusion in European countries. Since 2005 the dataset
has been covering 25 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland, and is the largest compar-
ative survey of European income and living conditions.
14See SOEP Group (2001) or Haisken De-New and Frick (2003) for a more detailed introduction to GSOEP.
134.3 FiFoSiM
FiFoSiM is a behavioral microsimulation model for the German tax and transfer system using
income tax and household survey microdata. The approach of FiFoSiM is innovative insofar
as it creates a dual database using two micro datasets for Germany: FAST01 and GSOEP.15
FAST01 is a micro dataset from the German federal income tax statistics 2001 containing the
relevant income tax data of nearly 3 million households in Germany. For our second data
source, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), see section 4.1.
The layout of the tax beneﬁt module follows several steps: ﬁrstly, the database is updated using
the static ageing technique which allows controlling for changes in global structural variables
and a diﬀerentiated adjustment for diﬀerent income components of the households. Secondly,
we simulate the current tax and beneﬁt system in 2006, using the uprated data. This allows us
to compute the disposable income for each person, taking into account the detailed rules of the
complex tax beneﬁt system. The modeling of the tax and transfer system uses the technique
of microsimulation.16 FiFoSiM computes individual tax payments for each case in the sample,
considering gross incomes and deductions in detail. The individual results are multiplied by
the individual sample weights to extrapolate the ﬁscal eﬀects of the reform with respect to the
whole population. After simulating the tax payments and the received beneﬁts, we can compute
the disposable income for each household. The result of this simulation is the benchmark for
diﬀerent reform scenarios which are also modeled by using the modiﬁed database and applying
the diﬀerent tax beneﬁt rules using the technique of microsimulation. A detailed description of
the FiFoSiM simulation model can be found in Peichl and Schaefer (2006).
4.4 Income concept and methodology
We use the disposable income deﬁned as market income minus direct taxes and social contri-
butions plus cash beneﬁts (including pensions) for our analyses. The unit of analysis is the
individual. To compensate for diﬀerent household structures and possible economies of scale
15In the last years several tax beneﬁt microsimulation models for Germany have been developed (see for
example Wagenhals (2004)). Most of these models use either GSOEP or FAST data. FiFoSiM is so far the ﬁrst
model to combine these two databases.
16Cf. Gupta and Kapur (2000) or Harding (1996) for an introduction to the ﬁeld of microsimulation.
14in households, we use equivalent incomes throughout the analyses. For each person, the equiv-
alent (per-capita) total net income is its household’s total disposable income divided by the
equivalent household size according to the modiﬁed OECD scale.17
The poverty (richness) line is 60% (200%) of median equivalent income. Choosing the richness
line as twice the median is arbitrary but common practice (see e.g. Medeiros (2006)). However,
when analyzing richness, choosing the richness line is not as problematic as choosing the poverty
line (usually 60% of median income) because the upper parts of the income distribution are
not as dense as the lower parts.
To account for the regional diﬀerences in Germany after reuniﬁcation, we adjust the incomes
with the consumer price index of the respective region provided in the GSOEP data. We
therefore express all incomes in prices of 2000. To account for regional diﬀerences across
Europe, we use PPP-adjusted incomes.
5 Empirical applications
In this section, we show that the new measures are not only theoretically interesting, as ex-
plained by the hypothetical examples in section 3.4, but also provide extra explanatory value
when analyzing empirical data.18 We present three empirical applications to illustrate the
diﬀerence of our aﬄuence measures to the common headcount index.
5.1 Development of poverty and richness in Germany
The ﬁrst empirical application is the longitudinal analysis of the development of poverty and
richness in Germany since the early 1980s. Table 1 presents the values for the median equivalent
income (p50), which is used to deﬁne the poverty (60%) and richness (200%) lines, the Gini index
17The modiﬁed OECD scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the head of household, 0.5 to every household member
aged 14 or more and 0.3 to each child aged less than 14. Summing up the individual weights gives the household
speciﬁc equivalence factor.
18Notice, we show that in fact from year to year, country to country or scenario to scenario the diﬀerent
indices develop diﬀerently. However, we do not claim that the data are very accurate such that every change of
a measure reﬂects an actual change in the population: Nevertheless, we show that under usual conditions the
choice of the indices and the underlying judgments does matter.
15of inequality (IG), the poverty indices (headcount and ϕFGT) and several richness measures
(headcount, the concave RCha
β and the convex RMed and RFGT,T2
α ).







1983 13.0 0.264 12.8 3.1 1.4 5.8 0.48 2.7 650 3.2
1984 13.0 0.271 13.0 3.3 1.5 5.7 0.51 2.8 753 5.6
1985 13.1 0.263 12.7 3.2 1.5 5.8 0.43 2.5 601 3.7
1986 13.8 0.253 12.0 3.0 1.4 5.4 0.39 2.4 519 2.0
1987 14.2 0.254 12.1 3.3 1.6 6.1 0.39 2.4 521 1.8
1988 14.6 0.259 12.5 3.3 1.5 5.5 0.41 2.4 631 3.4
1989 14.7 0.262 12.3 3.4 1.8 5.5 0.44 2.6 688 3.7
1990 15.1 0.259 13.1 3.4 1.6 5.6 0.42 2.5 625 2.4
1991 14.7 0.262 12.9 3.5 1.7 5.9 0.39 2.4 564 2.4
1992 14.9 0.268 13.4 3.7 1.9 6.3 0.44 2.7 630 2.2
1993 14.6 0.273 13.3 3.8 1.9 6.9 0.52 3.2 740 2.7
1994 14.3 0.281 14.7 4.5 2.4 7.0 0.53 3.1 773 3.6
1995 14.6 0.275 14.0 4.3 2.3 6.8 0.50 3.0 715 3.0
1996 14.6 0.271 13.3 4.1 2.2 6.8 0.51 3.1 724 2.6
1997 14.5 0.268 13.8 4.2 2.1 7.0 0.42 2.7 596 2.4
1998 14.7 0.266 12.3 3.7 1.9 7.0 0.46 2.9 637 2.1
1999 15.2 0.275 14.0 4.2 2.2 7.3 0.49 3.1 718 2.8
2000 15.5 0.270 13.7 4.2 2.1 6.7 0.46 2.9 684 2.3
2001 15.4 0.288 15.3 4.5 2.2 7.8 0.58 3.5 901 3.8
2002 15.8 0.283 15.6 4.6 2.2 7.6 0.52 3.3 775 2.2
2003 15.6 0.287 16.4 4.9 2.3 7.4 0.52 3.2 777 2.7
2004 15.3 0.291 17.3 5.0 2.4 8.1 0.54 3.4 778 2.7
2005 15.1 0.311 18.8 5.5 2.5 8.4 0.72 4.1 1157 5.6
2006 15.1 0.307 17.3 5.1 2.3 8.7 0.72 4.1 1150 7.0
Table 1: Values (in % except p50 (in 1000 Euro), IG, RMed) of the poverty and richness indices using GSOEP
data (equivalent disposable income), modiﬁed OECD-Scale, until 1990 only West Germany, incomes
in prices of 2000.
The values of various indices for both poverty and richness have overall been increasing in the
23 years of our analysis. Therefore, one could make the case of increasing poverty and aﬄuence
in Germany.
When taking a closer look at the development of the indices over time, one has to divide
the data into the periods of 1983-1990 (only West Germany) and 1991-2006 (East and West
Germany). Between 1990 and 1991, there was an increase in the number of rich people but a
small decrease in richness measured by RCha
β=0.3 and RCha
β=3. Inequality increased according to the
Gini index as well as poverty according to FGT, although the number of poor people decreased.
16How can this diﬀerent behaviour of the headcount and the intensity measures be explained?
The increasing number of people above the richness line is due to the overall decreased median
income since East Germany has been covered by the data as of 1991. The non-standardized
Medeiros measure RMed indicates that richness decreased in absolute terms. Both eﬀects, the
absolute decline in richness and the higher number of rich people, contribute to the change in
the intensity measures. The converging income diﬀerences between East and West Germany
explain the overall increase in the measures of richness and poverty after reuniﬁcation.
The new measures of richness can yield distinctively diﬀerent results than the ordinary head-
count index. As for the comparison of 1990 and 1991, from 1996 to 1997 the headcount index
indicates an increase in richness whereas RCha
β indicates a decrease. These eﬀects can be ex-
plained by changes in the income structure. If RHC increases while RCha
β decreases, the number
of people above the richness line grows (headcount), whereas the intensity of richness and in-
equality is decreasing. This shows that a more sophisticated analysis of the development of
richness yields diﬀerent results than just counting the number of people above a certain aﬄu-
ence line. Therefore, we propose to use the new measures in addition to the headcount index
for a more comprehensive analysis of richness.
5.2 Poverty and aﬄuence in Europe
Our second application is the cross-country comparison of 26 European countries in 2005. These
countries include the before 2007 EU-25 countries except Malta plus Iceland and Norway.19
Below, we use the term ”Europe” for this group of 26 European countries. Table 2 presents the
values of the various indices where the poverty (60%) and richness (200%) lines are computed
for each country respectively.20
19The EU-SILC countries include: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Den-
mark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland
(IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia(LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO),
Poland (PL), Portugal (PT) Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom
(UK).
20One should note that due to these variable poverty and richness lines, the values of the European poverty
and richness indices cannot be decomposed into the population weighted sum of individual country contributions.
For this exercise, ﬁxed European poverty and richness lines are necessary. However, this analysis (which can
be obtained from the authors upon request) does not lead to new insights besides the trivial fact that richer
(poorer) countries contribute c.p. more (less) to European richness and below (above) average to European







Europe 13.2 0.339 23.1 8.4 4.5 9.6 0.76 4.4 1073 9.2
AT 17.3 0.242 11.1 2.5 1.1 4.8 0.36 2.2 605 1.5
BE 16.7 0.264 14.9 3.7 1.5 5.0 0.38 2.2 695 17.5
CY 9.9 0.270 12.6 2.5 0.8 7.0 0.54 3.1 593 6.8
CZ 8.6 0.249 11.1 2.3 0.8 4.9 0.42 2.4 402 4.6
DE 14.8 0.255 11.3 3.2 1.6 5.3 0.43 2.4 749 5.9
DK 17.3 0.222 10.5 2.8 1.5 2.7 0.26 1.3 529 2.8
EE 6.4 0.321 18.2 5.7 2.9 10.5 0.88 5.2 549 4.3
ES 12.2 0.323 20.8 7.6 4.4 9.5 0.68 4.2 797 3.6
FI 16.0 0.251 10.4 1.8 0.6 4.6 0.42 2.2 893 10.9
FR 14.9 0.267 12.9 3.0 1.2 6.6 0.51 3.0 788 3.7
GR 11.9 0.343 21.5 6.6 3.3 11.0 1.01 5.5 1267 6.8
HU 6.3 0.330 17.4 5.0 2.4 8.4 0.90 4.3 758 16.2
IE 16.3 0.311 17.4 3.5 1.1 8.8 0.77 4.1 1595 16.7
IS 19.2 0.249 9.2 2.5 1.3 5.2 0.50 2.6 1099 5.4
IT 14.1 0.318 19.7 6.3 3.3 9.0 0.72 4.2 1033 5.4
LT 5.2 0.341 20.6 7.0 3.6 11.3 1.05 6.0 532 4.7
LU 27.2 0.275 13.7 3.1 1.1 7.9 0.60 3.7 1525 2.3
LV 5.0 0.380 22.3 7.9 4.2 13.7 1.38 7.1 809 16.7
NL 16.1 0.257 9.7 3.0 1.8 5.7 0.47 2.7 827 4.6
NO 21.7 0.268 9.6 2.5 1.2 4.0 0.49 2.2 2087 75.1
PL 5.3 0.332 19.3 5.7 2.7 11.4 1.00 5.8 530 5.2
PT 8.9 0.368 18.2 5.3 2.5 14.1 1.62 8.3 1641 16.4
SE 15.2 0.227 11.5 3.9 2.6 2.6 0.17 1.0 271 1.4
SI 13.1 0.227 10.0 2.2 0.8 4.4 0.26 1.7 291 0.6
SK 6.3 0.282 13.2 3.6 1.5 5.3 0.52 2.6 516 35.9
UK 17.2 0.318 19.3 5.8 2.9 9.3 0.72 4.2 1347 7.3
Table 2: Values (in % except p50 (in 1000 PPP-adjusted Euro), IG, RMed) of the poverty and richness indices
using EU-SILC data (Household equivalent disposable income), modiﬁed OECD-Scale, 2005, variable
poverty and richness lines
The values of these indices vary signiﬁcantly across countries. In general, poverty and richness
are correlated with the level of inequality. The highest (lowest) values of richness in terms
of the headcount measure can be found in Portugal (Sweden), whereas poverty is the highest
(lowest) in Latvia (Iceland). When looking at more sophisticated measures of richness, these
extremes remain. There are, however, diﬀerences, when comparing particular countries. We
see, for instance, that there is a higher percentage of rich people in Luxembourg than in Norway
(see RHC). We also ﬁnd higher values for RCha
β in Luxembourg than in Norway. But it is the
poverty.
18other way round for R
FGT,T2
α=2 . One reason for this ﬁnding is the higher portion of people with
income above 400% of the median income in Norway than in Luxembourg (see ﬁgure 3).





























Figure 3: Percent of population with income between 200 % and 300 % (white), between 300 % and 400 %
(light grey) and above 400 % (dark grey).
When comparing Germany to Slovakia we ﬁnd equal shares of rich persons (RHC) in the re-
spective countries whereas the intensity of richness (RCha
β ) appears to be higher in Slovakia.
Figure 3 shows that this can be explained by a bigger number of ”less rich” people with in-
come between 200% and 300% of the median in Germany. Further on, because of some people
with extremely high incomes in Slovakia (the income share of the top 1% is 7.1% in Slovakia
compared to 5% in Germany), the R
FGT,T2
α=2 index is also higher than in Germany.
The cross-country analysis yields 5 groups of countries in comparison to the EU average. In
most cases we ﬁnd neighboring countries in the same group. This classiﬁcation is in line with the
literature on welfare state typologies (see Arts and Gelissen (2002) for an overview). In general,
19Continental and Nordic welfare states are among the countries with low poverty and richness,
whereas Eastern and Southern European countries as well as the Anglo-Saxon countries have
high poverty and richness, indicating less redistribution in these welfare state regimes:
A) High poverty and high richness: Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
B) Low poverty and low richness: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Sweden,
This classiﬁcation of countries and their ranking, in general, remains robust when looking a
diﬀerent measures. However, there are some distinct diﬀerences across indices. For instance,
Norway, Slovakia and Belgium are among the countries with relative low richness according to
all measures but RFGT,T2
α which ranks them ﬁrst to third. On the other hand, Estonia, Spain,
Lithuania and Poland are ranked much lower according to this convex measure.
In comparison to the other countries, the R
FGT,T2
α=2 index for Norway is extremely high. This
high value is due to a few very, very rich persons in the Norwegian dataset. This is another
argument for using a concave measure, since it depends on the characteristics of the datasets
whether very high incomes are included or not.
5.3 Poverty and richness eﬀects of ﬂat tax reform proposals in Ger-
many
The introduction of ﬂat rate tax systems is widely seen as a reform which may boost eﬃciency,
employment and growth through simpliﬁcation and higher incentives, see Keen et al. (2007).
However, these eﬃciency eﬀects do not come for free. Inequality is likely to increase as a
consequence of a ﬂat tax reform implying redistribution from the poor to the rich. We try
to shed some light on the question whether the gap between rich and poor is widening as a
20consequence of a ﬂat tax reform by analyzing the eﬀects of two ﬂat tax reform proposals on
poverty and richness in Germany as a third application of our measures of richness.21
5.3.1 Current system and scenarios
The basic steps for the calculation of the personal income tax under German tax law are as
follows.22 The ﬁrst step is to determine a taxpayer’s income from diﬀerent sources and to
allocate it to the seven forms of income. For each type of income, the tax law allows for certain
income related deductions. The second step is to sum up these incomes and to take losses carried
forward into account to obtain the adjusted gross income. Third, deductions like contributions
to pension plans or charitable donations are taken into account, which give taxable income as
a result. Finally, the income tax is calculated by applying the tax rate schedule to taxable
income. The tax liability T is calculated on the basis of a mathematical formula which, as of
the year 2006, is structured as follows:
T(x) =

      
      
0, if x ≤ 7,664,
(883.74 ·
x−7664
10000 + 1500) ·
x−7664
10000 , if 7,664 < x ≤ 12,739,
(228.74 · x−12739
10000 + 2397) · x−12739
10000 + 989, if 12,739 < x ≤ 52,151,
0.42 · x − 7914, if 52,151 < x,
(13)
where x is the taxable income. For married taxpayers ﬁling jointly, the tax is twice the amount
of applying the formula to half of the married couple’s joint taxable income.
The modeled ﬂat tax reform scenarios are revenue-neutral combinations of tax base simpliﬁca-
tion with single tax rates as described in Fuest et al. (2008). Tax base simpliﬁcation is modeled
as the abolition of a set of speciﬁc deductions from the tax base included in the German income
tax system.23 The ﬁrst one has a low marginal tax rate of 25.1% and a basic tax allowance of
21In this paper we focus on questions of poverty and richness. We have analyzed the eﬀects of these tax
reforms on equity and eﬃciency elsewhere (see Fuest et al. (2008)).
22A more detailed description of the (modeling of) German tax rules can be found in Peichl and Schaefer
(2006).
23Our choice of simpliﬁcation measures is inﬂuenced by the German policy debate about existing tax breaks
and deductions. Naturally, this analysis is restricted by the availability of data. The complete tax base
adjustment bundle consists of the abolition of deductibility of commuting costs, the abolition of the saver’s
217664 euros (which corresponds to the current tax system). The second ﬂat tax scenario has a
higher marginal tax rate of 32% and a higher allowance of 12100 euros.
5.3.2 Results
The eﬀects of the ﬂat tax reform scenarios are calculated in the microsimulation model FiFoSiM.
In this paper, we abstract from behavioral adjustments, i.e. we assume that the economic agents
do not change their labor supply or savings in response to these tax reform scenarios. Table 3
presents the values of the measures for the diﬀerent tax reform scenarios in the manner of the
governmental reports on poverty and richness. In this methodology, the median and therefore
the poverty and the richness line vary in each case.24







status quo 17945 0.289 18.1 4.1 1.4 8.0 0.55 3.4 917 2.0
ﬂat tax 1 17657 0.298 17.8 4.0 1.4 8.7 0.66 4.0 1136 3.2
ﬂat tax 2 17968 0.287 17.9 4.1 1.4 7.6 0.54 3.3 920 2.3
Table 3: Values (in % except p50, IG, RMed) of the poverty and richness indices using FiFoSiM (variable
poverty and richness lines).
The values for the poverty indices do not change signiﬁcantly for the revenue-neutral reform
scenarios in comparison to the status quo, although the median income and thus the poverty
line vary.25 The richness indices, however, change due to the fact that the tax base simpliﬁcation
measures aﬀect higher income groups the most. For instance, the eﬀective marginal tax rates
are reduced for the highest income decile in scenario 2, whereas in the ﬁrst scenario they are
reduced in the three highest income deciles. The two reform scenarios change the RCha
β indices
into diﬀerent directions. The ﬂat tax with a high marginal rate and basic allowance (ﬂat tax
2) very slightly decreases these indices, whereas the ﬂat tax with a low marginal rate and basic
allowance, the restriction of labor income related expenses to 1000 e as well as the abolition of several tax
allowances for age, single parents, children and deductions for tax accountancy costs, church tax and donations
(charitable and for political parties).
24Our results, when using the same methodology, are in line with these reports (see Bundesregierung (2001)
and Bundesregierung (2005)).
25When analyzing poverty, one has to take into account that the lowest deciles of the income distribution
seldom pay income taxes, since there are always high basic tax allowances. Therefore, a reduction of income
poverty through tax reforms is naturally restricted. A reform of the beneﬁt system, like an increase in the social
assistance for instance, would be a more eﬀective measure. Further on, the minor distributional eﬀects can be
explained to some extent by the revenue neutrality of the ﬂat tax reforms.
22allowance (ﬂat tax 1) increases the RCha
β measures. The increase in richness is unanimously
conﬁrmed by RHC, RMed and RFGT,T2
α , but only for ﬂat tax 1. For ﬂat tax 2, RHC decreases,
RMed remains almost unchanged, whereas RFGT,T2
α increases. The latter eﬀect for ﬂat tax 2
can be explained by its design. The rather high marginal rate of 32% implies that only the
”super rich” are getting richer than in the status quo, whereas some people who have been rich
before change their status to non-rich. As RFGT,T2
α puts greater emphasis on the very top of
the distribution, its value is increasing whereas RCha
β , which gives more importance to people
just above the richness line, decreases.
A drawback of the approach of recomputing the (variable) poverty and richness lines is that an
increasing measure of poverty (or a decreasing index of richness) does not necessarily indicate a
worse situation for people with low (high) incomes as a result of the changing poverty (richness)
line. To account for this weakness of relative measurement, we ﬁx the poverty and richness








status quo 18.1 4.1 1.4 8.0 0.55 3.4 917 2.0
ﬂat tax 1 19.5 4.3 1.5 8.4 0.63 3.7 1086 3.0
ﬂat tax 2 17.9 4.1 1.4 7.6 0.55 3.3 924 2.3
Table 4: Values (in % except RMed) of the poverty and richness indices using FiFoSiM (ﬁxed poverty and
richness lines)
Not surprisingly, there is again no large variation in the values of the poverty measures for the
ﬂat tax with a high basic allowance (ﬂat tax 2). However, the ﬂat tax with the smaller existing
basic allowance increases the poverty indices due to the abolishment of certain deductions like
commuting costs and tax free bonuses for irregular working hours.
The ﬂat tax alternative with low marginal rate and basic allowance (ﬂat tax 1) increases the
richness indices. The scenario with high marginal rate and basic allowance (ﬂat tax 2) decreases
the headcount measure as well as RCha
β , whereas RFGT,T2
α increases, i.e. the diﬀerence between
the concave and the convex measure persists when comparing ﬂat tax 2 to the status quo.
This latter example shows clearly that it depends on normative judgments whether ﬂat tax
scenario 2 increases or decreases richness. Therefore, if one has to judge which tax scenario is
26Median income and Gini coeﬃcient remain unchanged compared to Table 3.
23preferable, e.g. in a sense that aﬄuence should be limited, the decision depends on the chosen
measure and its underlying assumptions.
To further analyze the eﬀects of the ﬂat tax reforms on population subgroups, we decompose
the measures according to the family status of the household into four groups: single, single
parents, and couples with and without children. The results are presented in Table 5. The








single, no children (9%)
status quo 26.3 7.0 3.1 6.2 0.49 3.0 836 2.2
ﬂat tax 1 26.6 7.1 3.1 6.9 0.59 3.4 1073 3.5
ﬂat tax 2 26.1 7.1 3.1 6.2 0.51 3.0 894 2.7
single parents (2%)
status quo 51.8 8.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
ﬂat tax 1 53.1 8.9 2.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 2 0.0
ﬂat tax 2 51.2 8.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
couple, no children (52%)
status quo 14.4 3.7 1.3 11.4 0.82 5.1 1354 3.1
ﬂat tax 1 14.8 3.7 1.4 11.8 0.89 5.3 1546 4.3
ﬂat tax 2 14.3 3.6 1.3 11.1 0.79 4.9 1343 3.3
couple with children (37%)
status quo 19.5 3.9 1.1 4.0 0.23 1.5 371 0.7
ﬂat tax 1 22.7 4.1 1.2 4.3 0.29 1.8 502 1.2
ﬂat tax 2 19.1 3.8 1.1 3.3 0.23 1.4 391 0.8
Table 5: Values (in % except RMed) of the poverty and richness indices using FiFoSiM (ﬁxed poverty line) for
subgroups
Expectedly, poverty is highest among single parents, more than half of whom are considered
poor. Among couples without children, poverty is lowest. Except for couples with children, the
indices do not change much when introducing a ﬂat tax and the changes are in line with the
results for the overall population.
Richness is highest among couples without children, whereas single parents are never among
the rich. Again, we see that RCha
β is in line with the headcount variation. As before, the convex
index R
FGT,T2
α=2 moves in the opposite direction when ﬂat tax 2 is compared to the status quo,
as it puts more emphasis on the ”super rich”.
246 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a new general class of aﬄuence measures. In contrast to the headcount,
the values of these new indices will increase with a rich person’s income. We apply several indices
to longitudinal data of Germany, cross-country data of Europe and we simulate diﬀerent ﬂat
tax reform scenarios for Germany. We ﬁnd that our measures of richness are a useful addition
to pure headcount calculations.
We discover distinctive diﬀerences between headcount ratios and the new aﬄuence indices in
our longitudinal analysis of the development of richness in Germany. The new measures also
clarify diﬀering eﬀects of the German reuniﬁcation. While the number of rich people increased
as a result of the decreasing median due to the inclusion of the East German population,
richness in absolute terms decreased.
Our new measures reveal additional information beyond the proportion of rich people as the
composition of ”the rich” is also accounted for. This becomes evident when comparing aﬄuence
in countries across Europe. We show, for instance, structural diﬀerences between the rich
population of Germany and of Slovakia, although the headcount index shows equal values in
both countries. We also ﬁnd that poverty and richness (compared to the local median) are
rather high in Eastern and Southern European as well as Anglo-Saxon countries, but low in
Continental and Nordic countries.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the (revenue-neutral) ﬂat tax reform scenarios have only small
eﬀects on poverty but some inﬂuence on richness. The results show the diﬀerence between
concave and convex measurement. A ﬂat tax with a low marginal tax rate and basic allowance
decreases, whereas a ﬂat tax with higher tax parameters increases our concave measure. The
convex measure increases in both scenarios. This shows clearly the normative implication of
the question whether a progressive transfer between rich persons should increase or decrease
an aﬄuence index.
From a theoretical point of view, we argue to use a concave weighting function to measure
aﬄuence. However, our general class is not limited to concave functions and we also deﬁne
a convex measure to compare it with the concave index. The empirical applications, though,
25show that the diﬀerent conclusions drawn from concave and convex measures are, in general,
not that big. Nonetheless, in particular cases striking diﬀerences became evident. However, a
qualiﬁcation has to be made. When comparing concave and convex indices, one has to take
into account that we based our analysis on survey data. If we use a convex function instead
of a concave one, the estimates of the aﬄuence indices depend extremely on the very high
incomes. However, in many data sets, high incomes can be excluded (due to non-response),
top-coded or anonymised, or less representative than other income ranges. One solution could
be to construct series of top income data based on tax return data. However, it is generally not
advisable to compare tax return data across countries as income tax systems diﬀer considerably
(see e.g. Atkinson and Piketty (2007)). Constructing a homogeneous cross-country top income
dataset is subject to further research and could lead to important insights for future cross-
country comparisons. Still, to be able to apply the R(x,ρ) measures, information about the
whole income distribution or at least the median income (for the richness line) is indispensable.
Therefore, it would be useful to merge such a top income dataset with information of the bottom
of the income distribution. Due to these restrictions we leave the choice of the weighting function
up to the researcher, depending on the research question and the available data. In the end,
this is a normative decision.
To sum up, our analysis showed that the measurement of richness is a complex ﬁeld. The
empirical applications revealed that the presented new richness measures lead to diﬀerent results
in comparison to the headcount index for some of the time periods, countries and reform
scenarios. Our approach accounts for changes in the intensity of high incomes and, therefore,
allows for a distinct analysis of structural changes at the top of the income distribution. We
propose to use the new measures in addition to the headcount index for a more sophisticated
analysis of richness.
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